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University of Pittsburgh, 1981; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1984. Mr. Adams concentrates
his legal practice on the law of condominium associations. Since 1992 he has served as a
delegate to the Community Associations Institute/Florida Legislative Alliance. He is a
member of the College of the Community Association of Lawyers, based upon published
writings, teaching, and speaking engagements in the field of community association law. He
is the author of a newspaper column called "Condo Life,"which appears in the weekly Real
Estate Section of the Ft. Myers News Press. Mr. Adams has lectured at the University of
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1. The reference to "community associations" means any mandatory membership
corporation tied to the ownership of real property, which corporation has a right of lien for the
collection of assessments. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(1) (1997). The most common forms of
community associations are condominium associations, cooperative associations, and
homeowners' associations. This survey covers legislation and cases from July 1, 1997 to June
30, 1998. Condominium related arbitration decisions; Declaratory Statements; and 1998
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Home penalty guidelines, which
are found at Rules 61B-20, 21 and Rule 61B-78, FloridaAdministrative Code, should also be
examined by readers for a comprehensive review of legal authorities affecting Florida
community associations for the period covered by this Survey.
*
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I. LEGISLATION
A.

Condominiums

Amending Florida's governing statute for condominiums, section 718
of the FloridaStatute,2 seems to be one of the Florida Legislature's favorite
pastimes. Before a legislative session begins, no one seems to know what
ideas will be thrown into the caldron. After the session ends, many wonder
why the changes were needed, and in many cases, what they mean.
There are approximately two million condominium residents in the
State of Florida, whose communities are operated by some twenty thousand
associations. Not surprisingly, the "condo vote" is a potent force in
Florida's political climate. The perceived need to address individual
constituent problems through legislation results in the state's condominium
laws almost being in a constant state of change.
Florida's first Condominium Act was enacted in 1963, and was
basically an enabling statute that allowed developers to create a
condominium. 4 When first written, the Condominium Act occupied six
5 Today it occupies forty-seven
pages in the statute book.
pages with double
6
page.
each
on
columns
During the 1970's, significant consumer reforms were written into the
Condominium Act.7
Notwithstanding the changes, the condominium
development boom continued. Quite naturally, legislative efforts began to
focus on operational areas. The Condominium Act was substantially
rewritten in 1976, and renumbered from section 711 to section 718, with an
effective date of January 1, 1977.8 The 1977 Act is still the basic format of
today's Condominium Act.
In 1986, substantial amendments were again made to the Condominium
Act.9 These amendments largely focused on operational issues, which

2.
FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998). Hereinafter referred to as "'he Condominium
Act" or "the Act."
3.
Letter from Bureau Chief Philip Nowicki, Bureau of Condominiums, to former
State Senator Dudley (Apr. 2,1998 on file with the Nova Law Review).
4.
FLA. STAT. § 711 (1963).
5.
Id.
6.
FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998).
7.
See, e.g., 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-201; 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-104. All citations to
Florida's session laws in this article refer to the changes to the Condominium Act currently
found at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp. 1998).
8.
1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-222 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (1977)).
9.
1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-175 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1986)).
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arguably tried
10 to make it easier for boards of directors to operate
associations.
Again, in 1990, there were a substantial number of amendments to the
Act, adopted largely due to the initiative of the Florida Bar's Committee on
Real Property, Subcommittee on Condominiums and Planned Unit
Developments." In general, these amendments focused on technical glitches
in the statute, and were generally favorable to the facilitation of association
operations.
Then, in 1991, the legislative philosophical pendulum radically shifted.
The 1990 Legislature created a "Condominium Study Commission"'12 that
went to nine cities around the State of Florida and listened to public
comment about perceived problems in condominium living. 13 In February of
1991, the Study Commission generated a 143-page report, which
recommended numerous and significant changes to the condominium
statute. 14 The end result was the legislature's adoption of a major
amendment package to the Condominium Act (a thirty-nine page bill), 5
which fundamentally altered the philosophical underpinning of condominium operations.
After publication, the law raised considerable furor, particularly with
board members. As a result, the legislature, in a special session convened to
16
address a budget crisis, decided to suspend implementation of the law,
which (after removal of some of the most controversial provisions) became
law in 1992.17 Thus, it is plausible to state that the "progression" of the
Condominium Act has gone from a developer's enabling statute, to a
consumer protection statute, to a "pro-board" statute, to a "pro-unit owner"
(or "anti-board") code of procedures.
The 1990's have been described as the "zenith of legislative
micromanagement
for Florida's
condominium and
cooperative
communities."' 18 Although there has been no evidence of legislative intent to
re-evaluate the regulatory excesses, which burden condominium
communities, there remains an apparently irresistible urge to "open up" the

10.
11.
1990)).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
1992)).
18.

Id.
1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-151 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-218.
See FinalReport of The Condominium Study Commission, February 1991.
Id.
1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-103 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718(1991)).
1992 Fla. Laws ch. 91-426.
1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-49 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
Joseph E. Adams, Community Associations, 21 NOVA L. REv. 69, 70 (1996).
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Condominium Act each year for some "improvement." The legislature
likewise remains willing to satiate those desires.
There were two condominium bills which passed out of the 1998
Legislative Session, both becoming law without the Governor's signature. 9
20
The first is chapter 98-195, of the Laws of Florida.
Chapter 98-195
became a law on May 24, 1998.21 The main thrust of chapter 98-195 was the
statutory codification of various regulations that had been previously
adopted by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes ("the Division"), and22which still are a part of chapter 61B of the
FloridaAdministrative Code.
In 1996, the Florida Legislature directed each state agency to review its
rules by no later than October 1, 1997, and to provide the "Administrative
Procedures Committee [with] a listing of each rule, or portion thereof,
adopted by that agency before October 1, 1996, which exceeds the
rulemaking authority permitted by" the Administrative Procedures Act.23
This mandate, codified in section 120.536(2), of the FloridaStatutes, further
directed the 1998 Legislature to consider whether specific legislation
authorizing the rules so identified, or portions thereof, should be enacted.2 4
The statute also requires each agency, by January 1, 1999, to "initiate
proceedings pursuant to [section] 120.54, [of the] FloridaStatutes, to repeal
each rule, or [a] portion thereof, identified as exceeding the rulemaking
authority permitted by" the Administrative Procedures Act, and for which no
legislative grant of authority was given to the agency by the 1998
Legislature. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation
identified twenty rule provisions which the Department believed exceeded
the scope of its rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedures
Act.25 The Department recommended legislative treatment of fifteen of the
identified rules. Most of the provisions found in chapter 98-195 emanate
from that request.26
Section 718.104(2) of the Condominium Act was amended to codify a
Division rule providing that a developer must file the recording information
for a declaration of condominium within thirty "business days" of the date of

19.

1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195; 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-322.

20. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.
21. Ch. 98-195, § 9, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1733 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718 (1998)).
22. FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 61B (1998).
23. Ch. 96-159, § 9, 1996 Fla. Laws 159, 159 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
120.536(2) (1997)).
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/3

4

Adams: Community Associations

1998]

Adams

filing the declaration of condominium in the county public land records. 27
The statute further requires the Division to prescribe a form for filing such
information. 28 A similar provision has been added to Section 718.403(8) of
the Condominium Act, dealing with recordation of phase amendments.2 A
developer is likewise required to notify the Division within thirty "business
days" of 30filing a phase amendment, again on a form to be prescribed by the
Division.
Sections 718.502 and 718.503 of the Act have been amended regarding
a condominium unit purchaser's right to void a contract for the purchase of a
condominium unit (from a developer) within fifteen days of the execution of
the purchase and sale agreement. 31 Unfortunately,. these changes add
additional confusion to the law. The amendment to section 718.502(b) of
the Act is a rule codification and states that a "developer may not close on
any contract for sale or contract for a lease period of more than [five] years
until the developer prepares and files with the [D]ivision documents
complying with the requirements of' the Condominium Act and Division
rules, and the "[D]ivision notifies the developer that the filing is proper and
the developer prepares and delivers all 32documents required by [the
Condominium Act] to the prospective buyer."
The amendment to section 718.503(b) of the Condominium Act
introduces the confusion. 33
The new clause provides that although a
developer may not close for fifteen days following the execution of a
purchase and sale agreement, and delivery of required disclosure documents
must be made to the buyer, a developer now is permitted to close if the
"buyer is informed in the 15-day voidability period and agrees to close prior
to the expiration of the 15 days. 3 4 This clause, in addition to containing an
apparent typographical error (should "in" be "of' or "within"), or at least
confusing grammar, seems to conflict with the disclosure language found in
section 718.503 of the Condominium Act which provides: "ANY
27. Id. § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.104(2) (Supp. 1998)).
28. See id. § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1727 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (Supp.

1998)).
29.

See id. § 5, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730 (amending FLA.

STAT.

§ 718.403(8) (Supp.

1998)).

30.

Id.

31. Ch. 98-195, §§ 6-7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730-33 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. §718.502-503 (Supp. 1998)).
32. Id. § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.502(b)
(Supp. 1998)).
33. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1730-33 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §

718.503(b) (Supp. 1998)).
34.

Id.
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OF THESE VOIDABILITY RIGHTS SHALL BE
PURPORTED WAIVER
35
OF NO EFFECT.,

Further, in the case of Asbury Arms Development Corp. v. Florida
Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes,36 the Second District Court of Appeal
held that the above quoted language in the statute means what it says, and
that the fifteen day voidability period could not be waived. 37 Given the
holding of this case, it might be questioned whether the legislature intended
to remove this language from section 718.503(1)(a)1 of the Condominium
Act.
Section 718.117 of the Condominium Act has been amended to codify
another Division rule regarding notification to the Division relative to the
termination or merger of condominiums, or the dissolution or merger of
condominium associations. 38 Pursuant to the new law, a board of directors
must notify the Division "before taking any action" to terminate, merge, or
dissolve. 39 Within thirty "business days" after recordation of the action, the
Division must likewise be notified.40 These reporting requirements apply to
all associations, not only those operated by developers.
Section 718.301 of the Condominium Act has been amended with the
addition of a new subsection (6),41 which specifically empowers the Division
with the "authority to adopt rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act to ensure the efficient and effective transition from developer control of
a condominium to the establishment of a unit owner controlled
association." 42
Likewise, a new provision of the "Roth Act ''43 section of the
Condominium Act was added.44 New section 718.621 of the Condominium
Act specifically empowers the Division to adopt rules "to administer and
ensure compliance with developers' obligations with respect to
condominium conversions concerning the filing and noticing of intended
35. FLA. STAT. § 718.503(1)(a)1 (Supp. 1998).
36. 456 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
37. Id. at 1293.
38. Ch. 98-195, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 1729, 1729 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.117 (Supp. 1998)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1726, 1729 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§718.301(6) (Supp. 1998)).
42. Id. See also, Ch. 98-200, § 221, 1998 Fla. Laws 1892, 1892 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(f) (Supp. 1998)).
43. FLA. STAT. § 718.604 (1997).
44. Ch. 98-195, § 8, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1733 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.621 (Supp. 1998)).
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conversion, rental agreement extensions, rights of first refusal, and
disclosure and postpurchase protections."45
The final changes of chapter 98-195 deal with operational details of
condominium associations. "46 Perhaps the most nonsensical clause of the
1998 amendments to the Condominium Act is a new provision found at
section 718.112(2)(b)4 of the Act.47 This new law permits a member of the
board of directors, or a committee, who is not present at a board or
committee meeting, to "submit in writing his or her agreement or
disagreement with any action taken" by the board or the committee, after the
48
meeting has occurred.
The statutory clause goes on to say that this
expression of "agreement or disagreement may not be used as a vote for or
against the action taken and may not be used for the purposes" of
constituting a quorum for the board or committee. 49 There is nothing in prior
law which would have prohibited such written expressions of "agreement or
disagreement." Since the law specifically states that these expressions
cannot be used as a vote for or against the action, nor for the purpose of
creating a quorum, it is certainly unclear as to the intended significance of
this provision.
Another operational issue embodied in chapter 98-195 involves
statutory codification of a Division rule permitting
50 telephonic conference
call meetings for association boards of directors. Since most condominium
associations are not-for-profit corporations governed by section 617 of the
Florida Statutes, it should be noted that section 617.0820(4) has, for a
number of years, permitted associations to participate
in regular or special
51
board meetings by telephone conference calls. Section 617.0825(2) of the
Not-For-Profit-Corporation Act would also extend such a right to
committees. 52 In any event, the Condominium Act now clearly states that
the board or any committee may conduct meetings by telephone. 3 The
statute also codifies a Division rule, which requires that a speaker phone
must be used at the situs of the meeting, so that the conversation of those
board or committee members attending by telephone may be heard by the
45.
46.
47.

FLA. STAT. § 718.621 (Supp. 1998).

1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195.
Id. § 2,1998 Fla. Laws at 1727-28 (codified as amended at FLA.

STAT.

§ 718.112

(2)(b)(4) (Supp. 1998)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(b)(5) (Supp. 1998)).
51. FLA. STAT. § 617.0820(4) (1997).
52. FLA. STAT. § 617.0825(2) (1997).
STAT.

53. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1726, 1728-29 (codified as amended at
§ 718.112(2)(b)(5) (Supp. 1998)).
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board or committee members attendinj 4the meeting in person, as well as by
any unit owners present at the meeting.
The final operational amendment of chapter 98-195, new section
718.112(2)(c) of the Act codifies a Division rule, 55 which requires that any
association rule regulating unit owner statements at board or committee
meetings must be in writing.56 Presumably, if there is no written rule, a
board cannot limit the "frequency, duration, and manner" of unit owner
statements at board or committee meetings.
The much more significant condominium bill that passed out of the
1998 Legislative Session is found at chapter 98-322 of the Laws of Florida,
which became law without the Governor's signature on May 30, 1998.
Chapter 98-322 is actually an amalgamation of several pre-filed bills, which
were combined during the legislative process. One of the more significant
topics in the Pre-filed legislation, relating to the governance of "master
associations, 5 was withdrawn from consideration by the legislation's
sponsors, at the request of the Division. 9
Perhaps the most significant legislative enactment from the 1998
Session was an amendment to section 718.111(6) of the Act, having to do
6
with consolidated financial operations of pre-1977 "phase" condominiums. 0
As has been the case from topics as wide-ranging as trimming mangrove
trees to conducting bingo games, the language now engrafted into the Act by
the 1998 amendment to section 718.111(6) arose out of the perceived plight
of a single condominium community,
which sought to address its
apparently questioned consolidated financial operations by seeking statutory

54. Id.
55. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.002(10) (1998).
56. Ch. 98-195, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1727, 1728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(c) (Supp. 1998)).
57. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-322.
58: See, e.g., Downey v. Jungle Den Villas Recreation Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 438 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
59. The Division has recently appointed a "study group" to consider the advisability
of "master association" and related legislative initiatives for the 1999 Legislative Session.
60. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)). The reference to "phase" condominiums in section 718.111(6) of
the Act is a misnomer. True "phase" condominiums are developed under section 718.403 of
the Act, and are sometimes known as "expandable" or "flexible" condominiums. The "phase"
condominium for purposes of section 718.111(6) consolidated operations are more accurately
described as "series" condominiums. See also Gary A. Poliakoff, Condominiums, The
Assessment Dilemma, 54 FLA. B.J. 268 (1980).
61. The Innisbrook condominium community in the Tarpon Springs area (on file with
the author).
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change.62 The bill initially introduced into the legislature would have been
limited to condominiums that were operated "as part of a rental pool in a
hotel or resort-type setting, where each unit of a similar type and square
footage receives a uniform rental income... [and where] the condominium
units were registered and sold as securities with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)" (i.e., the initial bill would have probably only applied to
this particular community). 63
According to information obtained by this author, another multicondominium community, with the Division support, requested that the
Bill's sponsors expand the statutory language, and allow any pre-1977 multicondominium community to provide for consolidated financial operations in
the declaration or in the bylaws, upon less than unanimous approval of the
unit owners. 65 The Division's stated reason for supporting such legislation
was that there are a significant number of older "phase" projects that are
operating in an "illegal" consolidated financial fashion anyway, with many
cases involving such operations going back twenty years or more.
Although there is undoubtedly adequate public policy to support this
amendment, particularly in the case of associations that have always
operated on a consolidated financial basis, the law presents some ambiguity,
and also some constitutional concerns. The new statute provides that an
association that has operated on a consolidated financial basis "may continue
to so operate," as long as the authority for same is contained in the
applicable declarations of condominium, or the bylaws. 67 The reference to
such authority having to be in the original version of the declarations or
bylaws was omitted by the amendment.
Accordingly, associations that have been operating on a consolidated
financial basis may legitimize such actions by amending the declaration of
condominium or bylaws. The statute goes on to state that an association "for
such condominiums"6 9 may provide for consolidated financial operations by
62. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
63. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
64. As Vice-Chair and Condominium Committee Chair of Community Associations
Institute's Florida Legislative Alliance during the 1998 Legislative Session.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
68. Id.
69. It is unclear whether "such condominiums" means multi-condominium
associations that have heretofore operated on a consolidated financial basis or any multicondominium association where the first declaration was recorded prior to January 1, 1997,
although the latter interpretation seems more plausible.
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"amending its declaration pursuant to [section] 718.110(1)(a) or by
amending its bylaws and having the amendment approved by not less than
two-thirds of the total voting interests."
It is unclear whether the twothirds standard is applied only to bylaw amendments (regardless of the
percentage vote stated in the bylaws to amend them), or whether the twothirds standard also serves to qualify the vote necessary to amend the
declaration of condominium (regardless of the vote required in the
declaration for amendment of the declaration). By reference to section
718.1 10(1)(a) of the Act, which incorporates a two-thirds standard, as well
as the lack of a comma in the text of the amendment, 71 it is reasonable to
conclude that a two-thirds vote of all voting interests is required whether the
declaration or bylaws is used as the vehicle for the amendment.
Although valid public policy may be served by legitimizing longstanding "illegal" consolidated financial operations for certain communities,
it is submitted that the "invitation" which has been extended to other multicondominium associations (which had found a way to comply with the
previous law) may also result in unintended consequences.
The
Condominium Act requires the declaration of condominium to specify the
percentage of, "and manner of sharing common expenses and owning
common surplus" in a residential condominium, which must be the same as
the ownership of undivided shares in the common elements. 72 The
Condominium Act further states that any amendment to the declaration,
which changes the percentage of sharing common expenses, must receive
unanimous approval of all unit owners and lienors.73
Additionally, the provision in the declaration regarding the sharing of
common expenses is a contractual right,74 and the law in effect when those
contracts were entered into (recordation of the declarations of
condominium), "is controlling as if engrafted onto the condominium
In addressing a somewhat analogous issue, the Second
documents. 7
District Court of Appeal held that changes to the Condominium Act could
not be applied to alter assessment allocation provisions in the declaration,
even where the declaration incorporated future amendments to the

70. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
(718.111(6) (Supp. 1998)).
71. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(1)(a) (1997).
72. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(g) (1997).
73. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1997).
74. Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, 351 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
75. Suntide Condominium Ass'n v. Division of Fla. Land Sales, and Condominiums,
Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 463 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Condominium Act. 7 6 Further, since the declaration of condominium is a
contract, 77 it is certainly arguable that the retroactive application of the 1998
amendments to section 718.111(6) of78 the Act will create an unconstitutional
impairment of vested contract rights.
Another significant (and regrettably ambiguous) 1998 change to the
condominium statute involves the insurance requirements of section
718.111(11)(a) of the Act and the "budget guarantee" provision of section
718.116(9) of the Act. 80 As a result of Hurricane Opal, certain developers
found they had unanticipated exposure arising out of uninsured or underinsured storm damage. 8'
The premise of a "budget guarantee" is that, during the initial sales
phase, a developer should be excused from paying assessments on its
inventory units, so as to not bear a disproportionate burden in maintenance
of the community, when its "units" are typically unsold, and thus not
"consuming" services of the condominium association. 82 The "budget
guarantee" language in section 718.116(9) of the Act permits the developer
to excuse itself from the payment of common expenses on developer-owned
units, so long as the developer guarantees in the purchase contracts, the
prospectus, or the condominium documents, that assessments against nondeveloper unit owners will not exceed a stated dollar amount during the
guarantee period. 83 In exchange for this excusal from paying assessments,
the developer agrees to "cap" the nondeveloper unit owner's assessments,
and must further undertake to fund any deficit incurred in the operation of
the condominium
(including
funding.. of reserves, unless properly waived)
•
•
84
during the guarantee period. Obviously, reconstruction of condominium
property after a catastrophic storm event is a common expense of the
condominium. If insufficient proceeds from insurance exist to reconstruct
the community, then the developer would be called upon to fund any
76. Island Manor Apartments, Inc. v. Division of Fla. Land Sales, Condominiums,
and Mobile Homes, 515 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
77. Pepe, 351 So. 2d at 757.
78. Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976).
79. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757-59 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
80. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2780-81 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.116(9)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
81. Sun-Sentinel, July 16, 1998, at § 1D, available in 1998 WL 12822301; Tampa
Tribune, Aug. 18, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 10802497; Tampa Tribune, May 31,
1997, at 4, availablein 1997 WL 10789835, at *8.
82. Ch. 98-322, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 2780, 2780-81 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.116(9) (Supp. 1998)).

83.

Id.

84.

FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.004 (1998).
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reconstruction costs not covered by the nondeveloper unit owners'
assessments, at the guaranteed level. While some might argue that with the
rewards come the risks, the 1998 Legislature apparently decided to let
developers "have their cake and eat it too." 85
Section 718.111(1 1)(a) of the Condominium Act now provides that "[a]
unit-owner controlled association shall use its best efforts to obtain and
maintain adequate insurance." 86 Previously, the law required all associations
to use "best efforts" to obtain such insurance. 87 As to developer-controlled
associations, the law now requires the association to use "due diligence" in
obtaining and maintaining such insurance . 8 Neither the term "best efforts"
nor "due diligence" are defined in the statute.8 9 There is no expression of
legislative intent, at least from the language of the statute itself, as to
whether "due diligence" is intended to be a higher or lower standard than
"best efforts."' 9 Section 718.111(11)(a) of the Act, as amended, goes on to
provide that a developer's "[f]ailure to obtain and maintain adequate
insurance during any period of developer control shall constitute a breach of
fiduciary responsibility by the developer appointed members of the board of
directors of the association, unless said members can show that despite such
failure, they have exercised due diligence." 91 At least, this legislative
pronouncement will soften the impact of a 1992 appellate court decision,
which exonerated developer appointees to the board of directors in a claim
of breach of fiduciary duty involving the failure to renew a fire insurance
policy, when fire destroyed common area buildings. 92
The provisions of section 718.116(9) of the Act, which further
implements this new policy, provides that "if a developer-controlled
association has maintained all insurances required the common expenses
incurred during the guarantee period resulting from a natural disaster or an
act of God, which are not covered by insurance proceeds" may be assigned
against all unit owners, as well as their successors and assigns, "on the date
of such natural disaster or act of God." 93 The developer's units are, of
85. Similar legislation was introduced in the 1997 Legislative Session and failed to
progress through the process.
86. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998).
87. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(a) (1997).
88. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).

89.
90.

Id.

Id.

91. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2757 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(11)(a) (Supp. 1998)).
92. Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc., 596 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
93. Ch. 98-322, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 2781 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.116(9) (Supp. 1998)).
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course, included in any such assessment. It is interesting to note that the
developer-controlled association is permitted to levy an assessment for "the
common expenses incurred during the guarantee period," providing they
"result" from a natural disaster or an act of God.94 Therefore, not only
would the actual cost of reconstruction be assessable against the unit owners,
but also any other costs "resulting" from the natural disaster, which would
presumably include engineering fees, attorney's fees, insurance
consultant/adjuster fees, and perhaps more.
The new law does not clarify how the expenses are to be "assigned,"
and no treatment is given to the issue of whether the assessments would be
booked to the units on an "accrual" basis, when the damage occurs, or on a
"cash" basis, when the work is actually done.95 The latter approach, cash
basis, seems more practical and will possibly result in further developer
excusal, since a developer will most likely have transferred title to units
between the time of a casualty and the repair work being done.
Another insurance related change to the Condominium Act effectuated
by the 1998 Legislature involves the issue of "fidelity bonding," which is
also a misnomer, since there is typically no "bond" purchased, but rather an
insurance policy, sometimes called an "employee dishonesty" or "crimes
coverage" policy. 96 There have been previous legislative attempts to
address this issue. For instance, in 1992, the Act was amended to implement
a minimum schedule of fidelity bonds based upon the association's annual
gross receipts.97 The 1992 statute required "bonding" of any person who
could "control or disburse" association funds, and specifically identified
such persons as the association president, secretary, the treasurer, and any
other person with check signing authority. 98 The new statute also requires
"bonding" of persons who "control or disburse," using the same definitional
scheme, but also stating that persons who "control or disburse" include, but
are not limited to the president, secretary, treasurer, and any person with
check signing authority.9 9 It is unclear who else was intended to be covered.
Most significantly, the new law requires that the bond or insurance
policy must cover "the maximum funds that will be in the custody of the

94. Id. § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2781 (codified as amended at
718.116(9)(a)(1) (Supp. 1998)).

FLA. STAT. §

95. Id.
96. Id. § 2, Fla. Laws at 2758 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(d)
(Supp. 1998)).
97. Ch. 92-49, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 435, 444 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §

718.112(2)G) (Supp. 1998)).
98. Id.
99. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2753, 2758 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111 (11)(d) (Supp. 1998)).
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association or its management agent at any one time."1° This language
creates a potential ambiguity as to whether an association must obtain a
fidelity bond for all of the funds that would be in the "custody . . . of its
management agent," when a large management company may control
millions of dollars, for many different associations. It is doubtful that this
was the legislative intent, or that the statute would be applied in that fashion.
Although this legislation is founded upon legitimate policy objectives,
and perhaps reiterates advice that most community association legal
practitioners would give to their clients anyway, whether the benefits
outweigh the burdens remains to be seen. If an association levies a major
special assessment for a significant repair project, it will have a large sum of
money under its "control" at one time, although it may spend that money
very quickly. It is unknown how the insurance market will adjust to the need
for flexibility that will be necessary for associations in obtaining adequate
insurance in such cases. Also, the law of supply and demand being what it
is, it further remains to be seen whether insurance companies will adjust
rates for "fidelity bonding," which has heretofore been a fairly insignificant
aspect of most associations' insurance premiums, to account for increased
exposure and/or its new "captive market." It should also be noted that the
Division has taken the position that the 1998 amendment to the fidelity
bonding section of the statute will not be enforced by the Division as to preexisting insurance contracts, until such contracts are up for renewal.' 0'
Section 718.111(12)(c) of the Act has been amended to include the
year-end financial reporting information required by the Act as part of the
disclosure
documents that are to be made available to prospective unit
.
102
purchasers.
Section 718.111(12) of the Act requires the association to
maintain an "adequate number" of these year-end reports, along with copies
of the declaration of condominium, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and
rules, and all amendments to the foregoing, as well as the "Question and
Answer Sheet."' 0 3 The "adequate number of copies" must be maintained "on
the condominium property to ensure their availability to unit owners and
prospective purchasers."104 This segment of the statute, which is not new,
does not take into account that many condominium communities do not have
on-site office facilities and, instead, a management company or other agent
serves as the repository of official records.
100. Id.
101. See Memorandum from Bureau of Condominium Legal Department to Bureau
Chief (June 19, 1998) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
102. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2753, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.111(12)(c) (Supp. 1998)).

103. See FLA.

STAT.

§ 718.111(12) (Supp. 1998).

104. See id.
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The inclusion of the year-end financial reporting information as a
required disclosure document is also enunciated in section 718.503(2) of the
Act as part of the documents that a nondeveloper seller must give to a
prospective buyer prior to closing. 105 Likewise, these year-end reports now
also comprise part of the disclosure documents that a developer must append
to the prospectus prior to the sale of a unit, as provided in section 718.504 of
the Act. 106 This change is clearly an improvement to the statute, at least for
those who believe that prospective condominium unit purchasers should
"know what they are getting into" prior to the purchase of a unit. Providing
year-end financial reports (although the statute is not clear, it presumably
means the latest year-end report) will permit prospective purchasers to
review the association's reserve funding policy, and other assessment
spending trends, such as special assessments.
Another financially oriented change to the Act was approved by the
1998 Legislature.
There has been an ongoing debate within the
condominium industry as to whether associations should be allowed to
"commingle" operating funds and reserve funds.
Proponents of
"commingling" argue that associations should be allowed to maximize
investment returns, which can usually be accomplished by obtaining the
higher account balances affiliated with "commingling" all of the association
funds in a single account.10 7 Opponents of commingling investment and
reserve funds argue that reserve funds are sacrosanct under the law, and
10
should be kept out of "harm's way," lest the boardoperational
of directorsneeds.
be tempted
to
on
spend money set aside for capital expenditures
The 1991 amendments to the Condominium Act prohibited an
association from commingling investment and operating funds. 10 9 Prior to
the effective date of this change, the 1992 Legislature changed section
718.111(15) of the Act to permit commingling of operating and reserve
funds "for purposes of investment."' 10 The game of "legislative ping-pong"
continued when the 1995 Legislature once again absolutely prohibited

105. Ch. 98-322, § 5, 1998 Fla. Laws 2769, 2770 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT §
718.503 (2) (Supp. 1998)).
106. Ch. 98-322, § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws 2770, 2770 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.504 (Supp. 1998)).

107. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1998)).
108. Id.
109. Ch. 91-103, § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws 724, 728 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (1991)).
110. Ch. 92-49, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 437, 440 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1992)).
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commingling.'" In the latest volley, associations may now, once again
"commingle," so long as the commingling is done for "investment
purposes. ' 12 Of course, only the future will tell whether the "anticommingling" forces will once again have their way.
The 1998 Legislative session produced two amendments involving the
election of condominium directors.
The first is another example of a law
of statewide application that exists to address the concerns of one Florida
condominium association.'
Apparently, it was discovered that a
condominium director in Dade County had been convicted of a felony.n 5
After the association determined that Florida law would not prohibit a
convicted felon from serving on its board, legislative reform was sought to
address this.' 6 During the session, proposed legislation was introduced that
would prohibit any "felon" from serving on the board of directors of a
condominium association 1 7 When it was pointed out to the legislation's
sponsors that this might prohibit expatriates of oppressive foreign
governments (e.g., Cuba, Libya, etc.) from serving on a condominium board,
the legislation's sponsors wrote an amendment providing that the conviction
must have occurred in a court of record in the United States.! 8 It was
pointed out to the sponsors that an association only has ten to twenty days to
mail out election ballots after receipt of unit owners' self-nomination
forms." 9 Thus, they could not be expected to conduct criminal background
checks within that time period. Therefore, sponsors approved further
amendatory language for the Bill, which provided that an association's
election of a convicted felon would not affect the validity of any action of
the association's
board of directors taken prior to the discovery of the
20
conviction.
As a result, section 718.112(2)(d)l of the Condominium Act now
provides that in order to be eligible for board membership, a person must

111. Ch. 95-274, § 35, 1995 Fla. Laws 2524, 2525 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.111(15) (1995)).
112. Ch. 98-322, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2757, 2759 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.111(15) (Supp. 1998)).
113. Ch. 98-322, § 3 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2762-64 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. §§ 718.112(2)(d)1, (2)(d)8 (Supp. 1998)).
114. Ch. 98-322, § 3, Fla. Laws 2759, 2762 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112) (Supp. 1998)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
119. Id.See also FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)3 (1997).
120. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
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meet the requirements "set forth in the declaration. ' 2 Further, the law
provides that "[a] person who has been convicted of any felony by any court
of record in the United States and who has not had his or her right to vote
restored.., is not eligible for board membership."12 2 Finally, this clause in"
the statute now provides that "[tihe validity of an action by [a] board is not
affected if it is later determined that a member of the board is
2 3 ineligible for
board membership due to having been convicted of a felony."'
Although this statute is certainly an instructive case study on how
condominium legislation in Florida is sometimes conceived and enacted, it is
doubtful that this law will have any practical effect on the operation of most
condominium associations. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the law,
and presumably an unintended consequence, is the language in the new
statute which states that in order to be eligible for board membership, a
person must meet the requirements "set forth in the declaration."' 124 As a
practical matter, very few declarations of condominium associations contain
qualifications for board membership, and the Condominium Act does not
require the declaration to contain such information.' 5 In fact, the Act
requires the bylaws to set forth the manner of selection of boards of
directors. 126 It could now be argued that the failure of a declaration of
condominium to establish board membership requirements results in any
person, whether or not a unit owner, being eligible to run for the board, with
qualifications contained in the articles of incorporation or bylaws having no
consequence. It is submitted that the legislature did not intend this result.
The other statutory change involving board elections involves a longstanding conflict between provisions of the Not-For-Profit Corporations
Act, 27 and a Division rule involving whether vacancies on condominium
boards are filled for the unexpired term thereof, or only until the next annual
election. z 9 Notwithstanding the general precedence that the statute should
be afforded over an agency rule, the Division has historically adopted the
position that the rule stating that vacancies are filled only through the next
general election is enforceable and would be enforced. 3 ° The 1998
amendment eliminates any potential inconsistency, and clearly negates the

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 718.104 (1997).
See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(a)(1) (1997).
FLA. STAT. § 617.0809 (1997).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.0021(13) (1998).
Id.
Id.
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Division's rule.' 31 The statute now provides that vacancies occurring on a
board of directors, before the expiration of a term, may be filled by the
remaining directors or sole director, or the directors may elect to hold an
election in conformance with statutory procedures.
In either case,
"[u]nless otherwise provided in the bylaws, a board member appointed or
elected 13.3 . . shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term of the seat being
filled."

In another game of "legislative ping-pong,"' 134 the legislature has once
again attempted 13to5 address the percentage vote required to waive or spend
"reserve" funds.
There are two issues involved in this subject. First, is
the vote required to waive or reduce the funding of reserves for a given
year's budget, 136 and second, the vote required to spend those statutory
reserves (or the interest earned thereon) for a nonscheduled purpose, after
the funds have been so designated. 37 The 1977 version of the Act did not
even mandate the establishment of reserves. 38 In 1979, the Act was
amended to require the funding of reserves for roof replacement, building
painting, and pavement resurfacing.' 39 The 1979 statute further permitted
waiver of reserves by a "two-thirds vote at a duly called meeting of the
association."'14
The two-thirds standard was reduced to a majority in
1980. 141The 1991 amendment to the statute added the clause that "[r]eserve
funds and any interest accruing thereon must remain in the reserve account
for authorized reserve expenditures, unless their use for other purposes is
approved in advance by a vote of the majority, of the voting interests present
at a duly called meeting of the association."
131. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).

132. Id.
133. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2764 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112) (Supp. 1998)).
134. See supra Part I.A for a discussion regarding "commingling."
135. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2765 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.112).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (Supp. 1998).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)3 (Supp. 1998).
138 See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)2 (1977).
139. Ch. 79-314, § 6, 1979 Fla. Laws 1666, 1667 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2) (k) (1979)). A later amendment added any other component with a deferred
maintenance expense or replacement cost exceeding $10,000.00. Ch. 86-175, § 6, 1986 Fla.
Laws 1207, 1207 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)(2) (Supp. 1986)).
140. Ch. 79-314, § 6, 1979 Fla. Laws 1666, 1667 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(k) (1979)).
141. Ch. 80-323, § 2, 1980 Fla. Laws 1391, 1392 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(k) (Supp. 1980)).
142. Ch. 91-103, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 728, 731 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)(3) (1991)).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/3

18

Adams: Community Associations

1998]

Adams

In 1994, the statute was amended to eliminate the reference to
"members present" for votes to waive reserves, with the required vote being
a majority"of the total voting interests voting in person or by
limited proxy.., at a duly called meeting of the association." 143 However,
the parallel provision of section 718.112(2)(f)3 of the Act, relating to use of
reserves for nonscheduled purposes, was not amended, so reserves could still
be used for nonscheduled purposes by a vote
144 of the majority "of the voting
interests present at a duly called meeting.
The 1995 Legislature did not help matters when it addressed these
voting requirements. Section 718.112(2)(f)2 of the Act was amended to
strike the reference to "majority of the total voting interests voting in person
or by limited proxy" and to replace same with the standard "by a majority
vote at a duly called meeting of the association." 1 45 It would be fair to
conclude that the 1995 version of the statute stood for the proposition that
waiver of reserves could be effectuated by a "majority of a quorum" vote.
Unfortunately, the 1995 Legislature also amended section 718.112(2)(f)3 of
the Act, and specifically struck the word "present" from the statute, leaving
this subsection of the statute saying that use of reserve funds or interest
accruing thereon for nonscheduled purposes could only be authorized by "a
vote of the majority of the voting interests, voting in person or by proxy at a
duly called meeting of the association." 46 Many commentators perceived
this as a "flip-flop" of the previous year's law 47 to mean that reserves could
now be waived by a majority of a quorum, but once established, use of
reserves for nonscheduled purposes would require approval of a majority of
the entire voting interests.
Although the 1998 Legislature certainly chose a worthwhile candidate
for statutory clarification its amendment to section 718.112(2)(f)3 of the Act
falls short of the mark.14 The reference to "a vote of the majority of the
voting interests voting in person or by limited proxy at a duly called meeting
of the association" is replaced by the standard of "a majority vote at a duly
called meeting of the association." 149 It is submitted that the difference
143. Ch. 94-350, § 7, 1994 Fla. Laws 2505, 2508 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112)(2)(f)(2) (Supp. 1994)).
144. Ch. 94-350, § 7, 1994 Fla. Laws 2505, 2508 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
145. Ch. 95-274, § 36, 1995 Fla. Laws 2525, 2528-29 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT.

§ 718.112(2)(f(2) (1995)).

146. Ch. 95-274, § 36, 1995 Fla. Laws 2525, 2529 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.112(2)(f)(3)).
147. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)3 (Supp. 1994).
148. Ch. 98-322, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2759, 2765-66 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT.§ 718.112(2)(f)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
149. Id.
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between the two concepts, at least based upon the grammar and words used,
is difficult to perceive. It is assumed that since the legislature undertook
amendment of this section, it was intended to amend prior law, and that the
legislature would not engage in a futile act. The Division has espoused this
view and has announced its position that both the vote to waive or reduce
reserves, as well as the vote to use reserves (or the interest earned thereon)
for nonscheduled purposes is now based on the "majority of the quorum"
standard. 50
In a relatively minor change to the Act, section 718.112(2)(f)1 now
provides that an association no longer needs to list the budget categories
specified in section 718.504(20) of the Act, if those expenses do not apply to
a particular association.1 5' Pursuant to a Division rule, 52 an association's
budget is required to reflect "n/a" in the column beside items that do not
apply'53to that association
(e.g., recreational lease fees, common area taxes,
..
etc.).
Although it is debatable whether the previous statute required such a
silly disclosure anyway, 154 the Division was nonetheless pursuing nonadherence to this technicality as a violation of the law. Therefore, although
one would hope that matters of greater import should command the attention
of our elected and appointed representatives, it appears appropriate to have
eliminated this problem.
The final amendment to the Condominium Act that was adopted in
1998 deals with the allocation of bulk cable television service charges to a
condominium association. 155 Prior to 1991, it had been held that a
condominium association's provision of cable television services,
as part of
56
the condominium budget, was not a proper common expense.
In 1991, the legislature amended chapter 718.115(b) of the Act to
provide that cable television services would be a proper common expense.157
The 1991 statute provided that "the cost of a master antenna television or
duly franchised cable television service obtained pursuant to a bulk contract
shall be deemed a common expense" as so provided in the declaration, and if
150. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.005(7) (1998).
151. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f)1 (Supp. 1998).
152. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.003(1)(d) (1998).
153. Id.
154. The 1997 version of section 718.112(2)(f)l of the FloridaStatutes required the
proposed budget to show certain expense classifications "if applicable." FLA. STAT. §
718.112(2)(f)1 (1997).
155. Ch. 98-322, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2768, 2769 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.115 (Supp. 1998)).
156. See In Re: Petition For DeclaratoryStatement of Becker, Courtyardsof Broward
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. DFLSCMH Case No. 89L-75.
157. Ch. 91-116, §3, 1991 Fla. Laws 1241, 1241-42 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 718.115(1)(b) (1991)).
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the declaration of condominiums did not so provide, bulk cable television
services could still be a proper common expense, "if it is designated as such
in a written contract between the board of administration and the company
providing .. .cable television service."' 8 It seemed that the legislative
intent (or the intent of the lobbyists for the cable industry) was that if the
board so wished, a condominium association would be able to buy bulk
cable television service, and charge all of the members. Obviously, it is not
very difficult to designate the service as a common expense in the contract.
The perceived inequity created by this law was that many condominiums
assess "common expenses" based upon the square footage of the individual
units, as opposed to equal assessments for each unit. Accordingly, an
apartment a few hundred square feet larger than the unit next door could pay
more for the exact same services under a bulk cable arrangement (a specified
number of outlets, basic channels, etc.). Of course, in any condominium
association with assessments keyed to unit size, the same could be said for
all services "consumed" (and paid for) by the larger units on a greater
percentage basis than the smaller units.
In an apparent effort to achieve equity, the 1998 Legislature has created
an amorphous new category of "common expenses" that may not be equal to
a unit's ownership 159
of the common elements, nor its sharing of other
"common expenses."'
The 1998 amendment to section 718.115(1)(b) of
the Act provides:
If the declaration [of condominium] does not provide for the cost
of... cable television . . .as a common expense, the board of
administration may [still] enter into... a contract [for bulk service]
and the cost ...will be a common expense but allocated on a perunit basis rather than a percentage basis if the declaration
provides
16
for other than an equal sharing of common expenses. 0
The law further provides that any contract entered into before July 1,
1998, and where the cost of services is not divided equally among all unit
owners, the internal allocation of the expenses (i.e. to an equal basis), may
be made by vote of "a majority of the voting interests present at a regular or
special meeting of the association."1 61 Although the statute presents some of
the constitutional and retroactivity issues that pertain to the "phase"
condominium associations' consolidated financial operations, 162 it appears
158. Id.
159. Ch. 98-322, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2768, 2769 (codified as amended at FLA.
718.115) (Supp. 1998)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part I.A.
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that certain associations now have a vehicle to more "fairly allocate cable
television charges" (although owners of the smaller units probably do not
think so).
B.

Cooperatives

Although lip service is usually given to the need to keep changes to the
Cooperative Act 763 in step with changes to the Condominium Act, the reality
is that this does not happen. Although the cooperative form of ownership
has been statutorily recognized in Florida since 1974, 64 cooperative
development in Florida has been limited. The most often stated reason is
that the mortgage banking industry is not comfortable with the concept of
loaning money secured by a share of stock and a "muniment of title," as
opposed to a fee simple deed to real estate. In the writer's experience, there
are very few residential cooperative apartment buildings throughout the
state, and there has been almost no cooperative development for new
apartment buildings in Florida for the last fifteen years. The bulk of
cooperatives which are still being created are "mobile home cooperatives,"
as defined in section 723.0791 of the Florida Statutes.165 The most often
stated reason why there is still cooperative development in the mobile home
context is that most of these communities are the consequence of residents'
purchase of rental mobile home parks ("park buy-outs"). Since the
Cooperative Act' 66 does not require lot surveys to create a valid cooperative,
as would the Condominium Act, 167 or a platted subdivision,168 the park
owners selling the parks, and the residents buying the parks, can save
substantial costs by avoiding a survey requirement.
Like legislative amendments in years past, the 1998 amendments to the
Cooperative Act did not keep pace with the 1998 amendments to the
Condominium
from chapter 98169
-•,,• Act. Most of the "Division rule" provisions
,
195 were included, while none of the "substantive" changes from chapter
98-322170 were included in the Cooperative Act. The clauses that were
included are essentially identical to those pertinent to condominiums,
discussed above. Some include thirty days notice after recording the
163. FLA. STAT. § 719 (1997).
164. FLA. STAT. § 711.42-.47 (Supp. 1974). See also Ch. 74-104, § 15, 1974 Fla.
Laws 163, 176 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 711.41-.47 (Supp. 1974)).
165. FLA. STAT. § 723.0791 (1997).
166. FLA. STAT. § 719 (1997).
167. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(e) (1997).
168. Id.
169. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-195 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 718 (Supp.
1998)).
170. See supraPart I.A.
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172
cooperative documents,' 7 ' notice to the Division of dissolution or merger;
board and committee member right to "agree or disagree" with board or
committee action; 173 provision for telephonic board and committee
conference calls-174 requirement that unit owner meeting participation rules
176
be in writing;173 Division rulemaking authority for transfer of control;1 77
requirement for filing phase cooperative documents with the Division;
prohibition against closing until disclosure documents have been provided to
the Division; 178 provision for waiver of fifteen-day voidability; 179 and
Division rule making authority with respect to conversion. 180

C.

Homeowners' Associations

When Florida first enacted a homeowners' association statute in
1992,18 1 many felt that the "camel had gotten its nose in the tent" and that the
statutory regulation of homeowners' associations would suffer the same
politically driven growth that has plagued the condominium community.
Fortunately, at least so far, those prognostications have not come true.
The growth of the homeowners' association statute182 seems to be somewhat
more controlled than legislative developments in the condominium industry.
What the future holds, of course, remains to be seen. Perhaps indicative of
things to come is legislation that was introduced for homeowners'
183 if
associations in the 1998 Legislative Session, but ,not passed.
• •
184One bill,
passed, would have placed homeowners' associations
under the
jurisdiction of the Division. The bill would have required, inter alia,
arbitration of homeowners' association "disputes" in the Division's
condominium arbitration program.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
Ch. 92-49, § 34, 1992 FIa. Laws 488, 488 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.

§

617.302 (Supp. 1992)).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 617.301 (1997 & Supp. 1998).

183. S. 2068, 15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998); H.R. 4129, 15th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1998).
184. See section 617.301(7) of the Florida Statutes for the definition of a
"homeowners' association." FLA. STAT. § 617.301(7) (1997).
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The legislation which did pass for homeowners' associations is found in
chapter 98-261 of the Laws of Florida, which became law without the
Governor's approval on May 28, 1998 and became effective on October 1,
1998.185 The original version of the bill contained a right to rescind
contracts for the sale and purchase of parcels in homeowners' association
communities for failure to comply with disclosure obligations of the
statute. 1 6 At the behest of the developers' and home builders' lobbies, the
ultimate bill was substantially watered down, 7with the recision remedy being
the main casualty of the negotiation process. 1
Section 617.303(8) of the statute has been amended to require
developer-controlled associations and developers to maintain association
funds separately from the developer's188 funds, and separately from the funds
of any other community association.
Similar to the recent changes to the
condominium statute,
the law for homeowners' associations has been
amended to provide that reserve and operating funds of the association shall
not be commingled prior to turnover, 190 although the association "may
jointly invest reserve funds."' '9 This language is apparently intended to
permit the pre-turnover "commingling" of operating and reserve funds for
"investment purposes," as is the case for condominiums. After turnover,
there appears to be no prohibition against "commingling," for investment
purposes or otherwise.
Section 617.307 of the statute pertaining to homeowners' associations
has been amended by the creation of a new sub-section (3). 192 This new
clause provides a "laundry list" of items that a developer is required to turn
over to the board of directors of the homeowners association within ninety
days of transition of control from the developer to the nondeveloper
194 with the
homeowners. 193 The list is similar to the list for condominiums,
19 5
audit.
an
for
most notable omission being the requirement
185. 1998 Fla. Laws 98-261.
186. H.R. 3321, 15th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998).
187. Ch. 98-261, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2280, 2281 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
689.26 (Supp. 1998)).
188. Ch. 98-261, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 2277, 2278 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
617.303 (Supp. 1998)).
189. See supra Part I A.
190. Apparently they may be commingled after turnover. Ch. 98-261, § 1,1998 Fla.
Laws 2277, 2278 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3) (Supp.1998)).
191. Id.
192. Ch. 98-261, § 2,1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278-79 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 617.303 (Supp.1998)).
193. Id.

194. See FLA.

STAT.

§ 718.301(4) (1997).

195. See FLA. STAT. § 718.301(4)(c) (1997).
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A new section 617.3075 has been added to the law for homeowners'
associations, which takes aim at apparent developer abuses involving the
inclusion of onerous terms in homeowners' association documents. 9 6 New
section 617.3075 declares that "the public policy of [Florida] prohibits the
inclusion or enforcement of certain types of clauses in homeowners'
association documents."' 197 Among the forbidden clauses are those which
have the effect of granting a developer unilateral ability to change
homeowners' association documents, including declaration of covenants,
articles of incorporation, and by-laws, after transition of control. 9 Also
forbidden are clauses that prohibit or "restrict" homeowners' associations
from filing a lawsuit against the developer after tumover.1 99 Modem
practice for many developers includes governing document restrictions
against post-turnover suits, usually involving a requirement for supermajority from the property owners. 200 Finally, clauses that permit a
developer after transition of control to cast votes in an amount that exceed
one vote per residential lot are declared to be against public policy. 201
The new statute declares all such clauses, granting a developer
unilateral amendment rights after turnover, lawsuit restrictions or posttransition preferential voting rights, to be "null and void as against the public
policy of this state."2 02 The legislature appears to provide a "grandfathering"
clause in section 617.305(2) of the statute, 203 wherein it states that the public
policy described above "prohibits the inclusion or enforcement of such
clauses created on or after the effective date of this section., 20 4 Since the
clauses are presumably "created" when the governing documents are
recorded, filed, or created, it appears that the legislature did not intend for
this law to apply to pre-existing governing documents for homeowners'
associations.
The final amendment to chapter 98-261 of the FloridaLaws does not
205
actually involve the statute for homeowners' associations,
but rather
chapter 689.26 of the Florida Statutes, which somewhat generically

196. Ch. 98-261, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws 2279, 2279-80 (codified at FLA. STAT.
617.3075 (Supp. 1998)).
197. Id.
198. Id.

§

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ch. 98-261, § 3, 1998 Fla. Laws at 2279-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 617.3075
(Supp. 1998)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. FLA. STAT. § 718.301 (1997).
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2207
regulates conveyances of land.2 °6 Section
689.26 has been amended 2°7 to
require any contract or agreement for sale of a parcel of land in a community
operated by a homeowners' association to incorporate a bold faced
disclosure summary, as well as "a statement that the potential buyer should
not execute the contract or agreement until they have received and read the
disclosure summary required [by the law]." °8 Unfortunately, the law
contained no remedy for its violation. 2 09 As noted above, the right to rescind
for statutory
noncompliance was removed from the final version of the
210
Bill.

II. APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS

A.

CondominiumDispute Jurisdiction;Arbitration

One of the most positive effects of the 1991 changes to the
Condominium Act was the institution of a mandatory, nonbinding program
212
although the legislative
for the arbitration of condominium disputes,
findings "that unit owners are frequently at a disadvantage when litigating
against an association" 213 and "that the courts are .. .overcrowded with
condominium . ..disputes ' 214 are suspect in light of the absence of any
known empirical data to support those findings. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the arbitration process for the resolution of condominium "disputes" has
been a significant improvement to the industry, providing a forum for parties
to condominium disputes a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Although
each citizen is guaranteed access to the courts, the simple truth of the
matter is that harried circuit court judges are often not the best public
servants to hear many condominium disputes.
In many cases, the
enforcement or interpretation of a house rule or internal policy may seem
petty or inconsequential. In other cases, the intricacies of complex or poorly
written statutory provisions are foreign to many trial judges, many of whom
206. FLA. STAT. § 689.26 (1997).
207. Ch. 98-261, § 4, 1998 Fla. Laws 2280, 2280-81 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 689.26 (Supp. 1998)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part I A.
212. Ch. 91-103, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 728, 732 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §
718.112 (1991)); ch. 92-49, § 23, 1998 Fla. Laws 468, 468 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 719.1255 (Supp. 1998)).
213. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(3)(a) (1997).
214. Id. § 718.1255(3)(b).
215. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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do not come from real estate or corporate law backgrounds, and all of whom
are called upon to be "experts" in almost any aspect of Florida's laws, on
any given day.
Arbitrators appointed by the Division are accustomed to mundane
matters 216 and are also well schooled in some of the subtle complexities of
Florida condominium law, such as the difference between a material
modification of appurtenances 217 and material alterations of common
elements.218
During the past several legislative sessions, there has been a continuous
effort to refine what types of "disputes" will be resolved in the Division's
arbitration program, and what matters must still be referred to court.
Likewise, there has been a noteworthy amount of reported appellate
litigation involving the topic. For the period covered by this survey, four
reported appellate decisions touch upon the issue of what "disputes" are
arbitrable or how the court must interact in the process.
219
In Cypress Bend Condominium I Ass'n, Inc. v. Dexner,
the
Association and Mr. Dexner entered into arbitration proceedings regarding
Dexner's alleged violation of condominium regulations. 22 Upon entry of an
adverse arbitration order, Dexner filed suit seeking a trial de novo pursuant
to section 718.1255(4) of the FloridaStatutes.221 "While the order contained
a certificate of service by mail dated May 19, 1997, Dexner
did not file his
222
action until June 19, 1997, thirty-one (31) days later."
The Association thereafter filed a motion in the trial court for summary
judgment, arguing that the suit was untimely filed pursuant to Rule 61B45.343(2) of the FloridaAdministrative Code, and parallel provisions of the
Act.223 The Association argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction,
due to Dexner's untimely filing of a complaint for trial de novo.
The circuit court denied the Association's motion, holding that since
Dexner had served a copy of this suit by mail within thirty-five days of the
order, it was timely pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.002 of the Florida
Administrative Code, which allows five days for mailing. 225 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal found the thirty day requirement of the statute and
216. For example, the most recent Subject Matter Index published by the Division's
arbitration program discloses some 60 reported Final Orders on pet disputes.
217. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1997).
218. FLA. STAT. § 718.113(2) (1997).
219. 705 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. (1998).
220. Id. at 681.
221. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1997)).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q-2.002 (1998)).
224. Dexner, 705 So. 2d at 681.
225. Id. at 681 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q-2.002 (1998)).
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Citing Markham v. Moriarty, the fourth district

held that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by not granting the
Association's motion.2 28
In Summit Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Coren, 229 a unit owner filed
suit against the condominium association regarding the Board's assignment
of parking spaces. 23 0 Although the court characterized the complaint as
alleging "multiple theories in several counts," 231 the court stated that the unit
owner essentially alleged that the board members preferentially assigned
themselves additional parking spaces unavailable to other unit owners.
The unit owners'
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
2 33
as damages.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in denying the
Association's motion to stay the action pending arbitration under the
Condominium Act. 234 The court rejected the unit owner's contention that the
dispute involved "title to any unit or common element," 235 which is excluded
from the statutory definition of "dispute", and ruled that the "dispute"
involved the board's authority to require a unit owner to "take any action, or
not to take any action, involving that owner's unit or the appurtenances
thereto, 236 which is included in the statutory definition.
Although the
court does not provide an extended analysis of the "multiple theories"
asserted by the unit owner, the case is consistent with those cited by the
court, which favor sending condominium "disputes" to arbitration wherever

possible. 238

239

The case of Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass 'n, runs counter
to the above noted trend in the cases of "when in doubt, arbitrate." 240 The
Association brought an arbitration proceeding against unit owner Mary
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Dexner, 705 So. 2d at 682.
707 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.

233. Id.

234. Coren, 707 So. 2d at 417.
235. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1)(b) (1997).

236. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1)(a)(1) (1997).
237. Coren, 707 So. 2d at 417.

238. See Carlandia Corp. v. Obemaur, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1997);
Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
239. No. 97-1683, 1998 WL 689766, *1, *1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
Telephone conversation with Rod Tennyson, Counsel for Appellee Association (Sept. 2,
1998).
240. Id.
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Ruffin, and her son, Paul Ruffin. 241 The Association alleged that Paul Ruffin
was a tenant, and that because of physical altercations on the Association's
premises involving Mr. Ruffin, both Mrs. Ruffin (the mother/unit owner)
and Mr. Ruffin (the son/tenant) were in violation of the condominium
documents, which prohibited unit owners from "permitting immoral or
illegal acts or a nuisance on the property." 242 In the arbitration action, the
Association requested that the Division issue an order requiring Mr. Ruffin
to vacate the premises, and to further restrain Mr. Ruffin from further entry
onto the condominium property. Mr. Ruffin, in his answer to the
Association's petition, informed the arbitrator that his mother had moved
away from the condominium and that the matter was therefore moot.2 43 The
Association countered that because it still "wanted protection against [Mr.
Ruffin's] possible return to the premises," it was entitled to an order stating
2
that "Mr. Ruffin shall remain away and off the condominium property."
Although not clearly stated in the opinion, it appears that the Division
obliged the Association and entered such an order.
Mr. Ruffin filed a complaint for trial de novo within the prescribed time
frame. 245 "The Association moved for summary judgment... on the ground
that the whole case was moot because [Mrs.] Ruffin had moved from the
condominium (and later died). 24 6 Thus, the Association argued, Mr. Ruffin,
who was never a unit owner, and allegedly a "tenant," had no "standing to
request a trial de novo." 247 The trial court accepted the Association's
argument, entered summary judgment on this ground, and reserved
jurisdiction as to an award of attorney's fees. 248
In a surprising decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, sua
sponte, ruled that the Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the
initial arbitration action as to Mr. Ruffin. 249 The court held that subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon a court by constitution or statute and
may not be created by waiver. The court ruled that "[t]he Division should
have dismissed the petition prior to the entry of the order enjoining" Mr.
Ruffin from coming on to the condominium property.2 1 Thus, the fourth

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.

245. Id.
246. Id.

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.

250. Id.
251. Id.
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district held that the request for "trial de novo was not moot." 252 The court
concluded that since Mr. Ruffin had requested the vacation of the arbitration
order in his complaint, and "because the arbitrator had no subject matter
jurisdiction to enter the order
the relief [sought]
' ' 3 [in the first instance] ....
should have been granted. 5
Although the result in this case will apparently create certain
inefficiencies for the litigants therein, 2 4 and although it is unclear why the
appellant, Mr. Ruffin, would have an incentive to continue litigating this
case if his mother had moved away from the condominium and died
assuming he did not intend to return, 255 it is submitted that the court's
decision is technically correct if the arbitrator indeed lacked "subject matter
jurisdiction." Curiously, however, the fourth district in Ruffin does not
consider the decision of its sister court in the third district case of Sterling
Condominium Ass'n v. Herrera.26 Although Sterling arose in* a slightly
different procedural setting, the third district held "that the statute is not
jurisdictional and that, therefore, the circuit court did not lack subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this dispute.' 2 7
The third district in Sterling also noted that the unit owner waived her
right to compel arbitration by filing an answer and otherwise actively
participating in circuit court litigation.2 It is unclear from the Ruffin case
why the same waiver arguments would not apply to Mr. Ruffin's conduct,
unless section 718.1255 of the Condominium Act does invoke "subject
matter jurisdiction." 259 It is arguable that a conflict now exists between the
third and fourth districts as to this issue.
In Clark v. England, 260 the unit owner, England, filed a complaint in
circuit court against the condominium association and certain individual
directors for malicious prosecution, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
slander, and conspiracy.261 The Association and its directors filed a motion

252. Id.
253. Id. at *3.
254. The Association presumably still has standing under section 718.303(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes to pursue court action against a tenant, although the action may be moot.
FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1)(e) (1997).
255. The prospect of exposure to the Association's attorney's fees seems to be a
plausible theory.
256. 690 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 704-05.
258. Id. at 705.
259. See Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass'n, No. 97-1683, 1998 WL
689766, *1, *1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
260. 715 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
261. Id. at 366.
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to stay in the circuit court action and to compel arbitration.262 The circuit
court denied the motion to refer the matter to arbitration. 263 The Association
and its directors appealed. 2 a
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Fifth District Court of Appeal,
after quoting much of the statute, stated that section 718.1255 of the Florida
Statutes "applies only to disputes between a unit owner and a condominium
association."2 65 The court held that the "prevailing authority's interpretation
of the statute" requires that the only litigants entitled to participate in
arbitration proceedings are unit owners and associations.
Without
providing much detail as to the underlying facts of the case, the court
concluded that "[a]lthough [Mrs. England] was a unit owner when she filed
[suit] in September of 1997, she was not a unit owner when [her] causes of
action arose, on January 14, 1997. "267
The dissenting opinion sheds a little more light on the underlying facts.
Apparently, the owner of the unit in question was a corporation, of which
Mrs. England was a director. 268 The core of the dispute involved the
corporation's right to assign to Mrs. England, individually, the right to run
for a seat on the board of directors of the condominium association.2 69
According to the dissenting opinion, Mrs. England asserted her right to run
for the board at a meeting of the board of directors, and when she refused to
leave the meeting after the board's request that she do so, she was
arrested. 270 The dissenting judge reasoned that since the corporation's right
to designate Mrs. England as its representative to run for the Board is
"within the contemplation of the arbitration provision and has now replaced
the corporation
as the owner of the unit, it appears that only she can seek the
271
answer."
The majority opinion establishes the principle that when a "cause of
action arises" is the benchmark for determining whether a party is entitled to,
or required to, submit to the statutorily mandated arbitration process.
Although this case can be somewhat limited to its own unique facts, the
establishment of a "when the cause of action accrues" standard could have

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Clark,715 So. 2d at 367.
266. Id. (citing Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
267. Clark,715 So. 2d at 367.
268. Id. (Harris J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id.

271. Id.
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significance in future arbitration decisions, particularly those where a unit
owner sells a unit during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding.
B.

Community AssociationAssessment Cases

After its third trip through the appellate courts, it is perhaps likely that
the dispute over charges for bus rides from the Sheffield and Greenbrier
Condominiums in Palm Beach County has generated enough attorneys' fees
to provide all of the litigants with chauffeured limousine trips to their
shopping excursions for the rest of their lives. In Sheffield B Condominium
Ass'n, v. Scudder,272 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court misinterpreted its mandate in Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium
Ass'n, 273 referred to as "Greenbrier II" in the opinion. 274 "In GreenbrierII,
[the appellate court] reversed the trial court's holding that the 'one-rider
rule' imposed by the Association was reasonable. 2 75 The appellate opinion
in GreenbrierII stated that "while the 'one-rider rule' was unreasonable ....
the balance of the transportation assessments imposed by the Association
was valid. 27 6 The mandate in Greenbrier II was "for the trial court to
determine the amount of the improper assessment, which would have been
court
the amount charged pursuant to the 'one-rider' rule, and [for the ..trial
, ,,277
to] adjust the accounting on the transportation assessment accordingly.
Apparently, "however, on remand the Unit Owners convinced the trial
court that the entire transportation assessment was invalid simply because
[the fourth district had] determined the 'one-rider' surcharge to be
unreasonable" in GreenbrierII.27 The trial court's order was thus reversed,
with instructions "to enter judgment in favor of the Association on all issues
except the 'one-rider' surcharge." 279
The fourth district also reversed the trial court's
•.• 280 order assessing
On remand the
prevailing party attorney's fees against the association.
trial court was directed to "determine the prevailing party of [the] litigation,"

272. 698 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
273. 663 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
274. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C. Condominium, 663
So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)). See also Joseph E. Adams, Community
Associations, 21 NOVA L. REV. 69, 79-81 (1996).
275. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Sheffield, 698 So. 2d at 1271.
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while 2"being
mindful that the Association has prevailed on all but one
81
issue.
Undoubtedly, the most significant assessment collection case for
Florida's community association practitioners is Bryan v. Clayton.1 2 In its
per curiam opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal confronted the
question of "whether maintenance assessments [for a condominium]
homeowner's association are 'debts' for purposes of [compliance with] the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,"' 3 and the Florida Consumer Collection
Practices Act. 284 Relying on a series of federal district court cases, Florida's
fifth district concluded that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not
embrace association assessments. 285
Apparently, while the Bryan case was still pending on a motion for
rehearing, the United States District Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
issued the decision of Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein, & Bright, Ltd.,286
which is the first federal appellate decision on the issue. 287 In Newman, Mr.
and Mrs. Newman had received a collection letter from a law firm, which
had been sent on behalf of the board of directors of a condominium
association.2 8 "The letter informed the Newmans that they were in default
on their obligation to pay" common expenses, , and
past due
. 289 sought
,
maintenance fees, late fees, interest, and attorney's fees.
"The letter stated
that if the amount demanded was not paid within thirty days, the association
would commence [foreclosure] proceedings. 290 The Newmans filed suit
against the law firm pursuant to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Ac291
("FDCPA"), alleging that the law firm failed to provide a "validation
notice" 292 and specifically alleging that the letters did not disclose that the
"defendants were attempting to collect a debt and that any information
obtained would be used for that purpose. ' 293 The unit owners also "asked
the district court to certify a class comprised of all individuals who had
281. Id.
282. 698 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

283. Id. at 1237 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994)).
284. Bryan, 698 So. 2d at 1237 (citing FLA. STAT. § 559.55 (1997)).
285. Id. (citing Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Fla. 1995) aff'd, 66 F.3d 342
(11th Cir. 1995)).
286. 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997).
287. Id. at 480. A companion case was also consolidated in this appeal. Id. at 477.
288. Id. at 479.
289. Id.
290. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479.
291. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1984).
292. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479 (citing Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir.

1996)).
293. Id.
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received similar letters from the defendant law firms and to agoint plaintiffs
as class representatives" (and their counsel as class counsel).
Relying on several federal district court decisions, the trial court
dismissed the action. 295 Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged that "no federal court ha[d] yet concluded that the obligation
to pay a condominium assessment constitutes a 'debt' under the FDCPA,"
and went on to specifically hold that association assessments do constitute a
"debt."2 96 The court noted that the "credit requirement" from the case of
Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group 297 had been recently rejected by another
Seventh Circuit panel in the case of Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster &
Neider, S.C. 298 The Seventh Circuit, in Newman, held that the obligation to
pay assessments arose upon the purchase of a unit, thereby satisfying the
requirement of a "transaction" to create the "debt." 299 The Court also found
it undebatable that the
3 °° assessments were used for "personal, family, or
household purposes."
Notwithstanding the opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit, Florida's
fifth district, in Bryan, declined to change its ruling, after due consideration
of the appellee's motion to stay or recall mandate. 3 0 The fifth district noted
that although "part of the text of our opinion might have been different," had
it had the opportunity to consider the opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit
in Newman, its "decision to affirm would not have been different. '302 The
Bryan court remained unconvinced, notwithstanding the opinion of the
court, that condominium assessments constitute a "consumer
Newman
,30 3
debt.
Since the FDCPA is a federal statute, it seems reasonably clear that the
opinion of the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will take precedence
over a decision from a state intermediate appellate court. Although the
Bryan court reaches the better decision in terms of policy, 3°4 prudent
practitioners are well-advised to comply with the FDCPA.

294. Id.
295. Id. at 479-80.
296. Id. at 480.
297. 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987).
298. Newman, 119 F.3d at 479 (citing Bass v. Stulper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider,
S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Bryan, 698 So. 2d at 1237.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1237-38.
304. Community association interest groups should urge Congress to review this
matter.
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The case of Southeast & Associates, Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners
Ass'n,30 5 involves foreclosure of a condominium association lien, and the
adequacy of constructive service of process.306 A $90.00 "assessment for
semi-annual maintenance became due on July 1, 1995," which Mr. and Mrs.
Love, the unit owners, failed to pay. 30 7 "The association sent'a notice of
delinquency by certified mail to the Loves' [unit at the condominiuml,
3 8
warning that the association could file a lien" if payment was not made. 0
"The notice was accepted by someone on behalf of the Loves, who signed
the return receipt card. ' 3°

After nonpayment, the association filed a lien, sending a thirty-day
notice of intent to foreclose to the same address, which was again accepted
on the Loves' behalf.310 "Just before the expiration of this thirty-day period,
a partial payment was sent to the association. 3 1' The association 3notified
12
the Loves that full payment would be necessary to avoid foreclosure.
The association subsequently initiated a foreclosure action, and hired a
process server to serve the foreclosure complaint on the Loves. 313 The
process server could not locate the Loves at the unit, and made nine attempts
to serve them there. 314 "Unbeknownst to the association, the Loves were
residing at their New York address., 315 "The process server [also]
performed two skip traces and.. ." asked the neighbors on both sides of the
property if they knew where the Loves had been.3 6 Other efforts, including
tracing a business address, were also fruitless.3 7
3
Subsequently, the association served the Loves by publication.318
"[A]fter filing an affidavit of diligent search by the process server and an
affidavit of constructive service executed by the association's counsel," a
default was entered in the suit.319 A foreclosure judgment was subsequently
entered 320
.

305. 704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Southeast &Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Southeast &Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Southeast &Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 695.
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"Southeast and Associates was the successful bidder at the foreclosure
sale. ' Nine days after a certificate of title was issued, the "Loves moved
to set aside the sale based on an insufficient service of process." 322 The sale
was set aside when the trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent
search and inquiry by the association. 323 The Fourth District Court
324 of
Appeal reversed, finding that the association had made a diligent search.
The court analyzed the policies served by the constructive service
statute, the doctrine of void versus voidable titles, and the impact on
marketability of title that uneven judicial treatment of the adequacy of
constructive service can have. 325 The court distinguished other association
cases where lack of diligence was shown, concluding that the association's
process server had demonstrated "diligent search and inquiry. ' 326 The court
implicitly concluded that, at best, voidable title had passed, which by virtue
of Southeast's unquestioned status as a bona fide purchaser, would have
extinguished any claim by the Loves. In concluding, the court noted that the
Loves "could easily have provided the association with their New York
address," and further found it relevant that "someone on their behalf kept
signing for the certified letters, sending in a partial payment. ' 32 7
The case of Limner v. Country Pines Condominium Ass'n, touches
upon a very important issue to many condominium associations; the
relationship between the association's assessment lien and the lien of a
foreclosing mortgagee.129 Unfortunately, the reported decision is largely
devoid of a discussion of the facts underlying the particular litigation.330
The court begins its opinion by ruling that section 718.116 of the
Florida Statutes "limits the mortgagee's liability in [that] case to the lesser
of six months of unpaid assessments or one per cent of the original mortgage
debt. ' 33' The court goes on to state that "[t]he amendment to the statute does
not apply to this lawsuit," because the suit was filed before the effective date
of the statute.332 The court does not specify which "amendment to the
statute" it is discussing. It is presumably the 1994 amendment to section

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id. at 696-97.
Southeast & Assocs., Inc., 704 So. 2d at 696.
Id.
Id. at 697.
709 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.at 154.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1)(b)(1) (1997)).
Id.
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718.116 of the Act,333 because that is the only amendment to the relevant
portions of the Act since the 1993 version, which the court cites as the
controlling authority.334
The court held that there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the
provisions of section 718.116, dealing with a mortgagee's liability for six
months of unpaid assessments or one percent of the original mortgage debt,
do not equally apply to a former unit owner who has taken back a first
mortgage as part of a sale of a unit, apparently the issue in this case.335
Although the opinion's failure to recite the facts hampers the ability to more
thoroughly analyze the logic of the decision, it is not evident how the 1994
amendment to the Act would have benefited either party to the litigation.
Further, although the court's unembellished statement that "La~pplication of
the statute does not amount to a constitutional violation"
raises one's
curiosity, the lack of proper recitation of facts (when the mortgage was
recorded, when the foreclosure judgment was taken, who bid at the
foreclosure sale or whether a deed in lieu of foreclosure was involved, the
parties' theories and arguments, etc.) unfortunately render this case to one of
limited precedential value for community association legal practitioners.
The case of Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc.,337 involved a
homeowners' association's ability to require a purchaser at a tax sale to buy
an "equity certificate" in the country club/homeowners' association. 338 The
relevant declaration of covenants required every purchaser of a lot in the
subdivision to purchase an equity certificate, thus becoming a member of the
country club, which also served as the governing homeowners' association
for the development. 339 "On November 7, 1994 Mr. Gainer purchased a tax
deed for a lot in Fiddlesticks.,, 34 0 After the association's demand that Mr.
Gainer purchase an equity certificate, and his refusal to do so, lien and
foreclosure proceedings were commenced. 341 At trial, Mr. Gainer argued
that the declaration provision requiring purchase of the equity certificate did
not survive the tax sale pursuant to section 197.573 of the Florida
Statutes.342 This statute "has long provided that a covenant does not survive
a tax sale if it requires 'the grantee to expend money for any purpose, except
333. Ch. 94-350, § 10, 1994 Fla. Laws 2511, 2511 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 718.116(1)(b)(1) (1997)).
334. Limner, 709 So. 2d at 154.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
338. Id. at 76.
339. Id. at 77.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Gainer,710 So. 2d at 77 (citingFLA. STAT. § 197.573 (1993)).
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one that may require that the premises be kept in a sanitary or sightly
condition or one to abate nuisances or undesirable conditions.' 343 The
second district concluded that there was no dispute that the purchase
of an
344
equity certificate did not fall within the quoted exception to the law.
Section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes was enacted in 1995. 34 This
section provides that restrictions contained in a declaration of covenants
survive a tax sale. 34 6 The association was able to convince the court that
although the 1995 amendment to the law was not binding per se, the
amendment was an effort to clarify exemptions previously contained in the
statute, recognizing that homeowners' associations were not commonplace
when the exceptions to the statute were written into the law, and the fact that
homeowners' associations were not subject to statutory regulation at all until
1992. 347 Citing State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance, Inc. v. Laforet 348 and
Landi v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the second district, in
Gainer,350 rejected the notion that there was an ambiguity in section 197.573
of the FloridaStatutes, or that it was clarified by the subsequent enactment
of section 617.312.351
Had the 1995 amendment to section 617.312352 not occurred, this
decision would have a devastating impact on homeowners' associations in
Florida. Purchasers at tax sales could essentially accept the benefits of the
association's maintenance of their property, and the consequent
enhancement of their property's value, but would not be called upon to
contribute to the expenses of doing so. Fortunately, the 1995 amendment to
section 617.312 of the statute for homeowners' associations should
substantially limit the application of this case.

343. Id. at 76.

344. Id.
345. Ch. 95-274, § 62, 1995 Fla. Laws 2553, 2553 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 617.312 (1995)).
346. FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995).
347. Although these arguments do not appear in the reported opinion, the writer is
familiar with the arguments made to the court both at trial and on appeal, as a consequence of
having served as general corporate counsel to Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc. during the
period of the litigation.
348. 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995).
349. 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
350. Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country Club, Inc., 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
351. Id. at 77 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., Inc. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla.
1995)); Landi v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
352. FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995).
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353
The case of Concerned Class Members v. Sailfish Point, Inc.
presented "an issue of first impression for [the] Florida state courts [to-wit]:
whether individual, non-named class members who have not formally
intervened in a class action have standing to appeal a final judgment binding
on all class members., 354 The court announced:

Prior to approval of a settlement agreement ending [the underlying]
class action litigation between the 524 residents of the Sailfish
Point development and the developer, Mobil Land Development
Corporation, a group of fourteen class members calling themselves
"Concerned Class Members" sought to be named as additional
355
party plaintiffs and to intervene in the litigation as a subclass.
The trial court denied the "Concerned Class Members" motion to intervene
and be named as party plaintiffs, but did allow them to be heard on a
separate motion which would require a vote from the residents on the
356
proposed settlement with Mobile Land Development Corporation.
The residents voted, and, by majority vote, approved the settlement
agreement, which was ultimately approved by the court.3 57 "Twelve of the
fourteen Concerned Class Members filed a notice of appeal from the order
approving the settlement." 358 The original class representatives, the Sailfish
Point Owners representatives, moved to dismiss the "Concerned Class
Members" appeal. "3 9
The fourth district, noting the lack of authority in Florida, found it
appropriate to look at applicable federal cases as persuasive authority. 360
The court noted that the "[flederal courts addressing the issue are split, with
the Eleventh Circuit joining the majority of federal courts in holding [that]
non-named class members must intervene formally in the class action to
[have] standing to appeal. 36 '
The fourth district found particularly persuasive the rationale of Guthrie
v. Evans,362 which held, inter alia, that "class actions could become
353. 704 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
354. Id. at 201.

355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Sailfish Point,704 So. 2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.

362. 815 F.2d 626 (llth Cir. 1987).
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unmanageable and non-productive if each member could individually decide
,,363
to appeal.'
The fourth district concluded that "because the Concerned
Class Members did not intervene [in the trial of the case], nor did they
appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to establish a subclass," they
lacked standing to appeal approval of the settlement agreement. 364
The case of Arvida/JMB Partnersv. Council of Villages, Inc.,365 dealt
with the elements parties seeking class action certification in community
association litigation need to establish. 366 The Council of Villages, Inc.
(Council), the Country Club Maintenance Association, Inc. (CCMA), the
Master Homeowners' Association for the [Broken Sound PUD (Planned
Urban Development)], and six residents filed suit against various developer
entities (Arvida) and the Broken Sound Club, a private country club.367 The
Council is an organization formed by some of the homeowners in the Broken
Sound PUD for the purpose of seeking turnover of the Club to the property
owners in Broken Sound.368 Count I of the plaintiff's complaint claimed
that:
Arvida violated Boca Raton city ordinances by (1) not turning over
ownership of certain open spaces to an organization of property
owners, (2) arranging that members be charged for use of this open
space, and (3) obtaining park credit for facilities that became the
property of a private club, when, according to the ordinance, they
should have been the property of an organization of the property
owners. 369
Count II of the suit was for civil theft.370 Count III sounded in
constructive trust and Count IV pled unjust enrichment. 371 The trial court
granted class certification on Count I, violation of city ordinance, denied
class certification on Count Il, constructive trust, while omitting to make a
determination
respecting Count II, civil theft and Count IV, unjust
372
enrichment.

363. Sailfish Point, 704 So. 2d at 202 (citing Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628
(1 th Cir. 1987)).
364. Id.
365. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1766 (4th Dist. Ct. App. July 29, 1998).

366. Id. at D1767.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
Id.

Id.
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The case was also complicated by the fact that there were certain nondefendant appellants who were given leave to intervene in the trial
proceedings relative to class certification.373 These nondefendant appellants
were the owners of apartment complexes, which might be converted into
condominiums. 374 The apartment building owners argued that the single
family homeowners' interests were antagonistic to those of the apartment
building owners, and so the Council should not serve as the class
representative.3 75 The trial court added "to the proposed class... [of] single
family homeowners in the PUD, ' ,37 6 the apartment building owners, and all
other property owners within the Broken Sound PUD to its certification of a
class for Count I violation of city ordinance. "The court concluded [that] the
issue was essentially whether there was violation of an ordinance
requirement that all of the open space reserved for common use be owned in
fee simple by an organization of property owners within the PUD. ' 377
On appeal, the plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants sought certification
of two classes:
"Class A, consisting of all resident single family
homeowners, to assert the objective of turnover of ownership of the Club,
and Class B, consisting of equity owners in the Club, to seek recision of past
Club membership purchases and [a] refund of amounts paid as membership
fees. 3 78 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that since certain
defendants in the suit, namely the developers, were also property owners
within the PUD, a class of all property owners would have interests adverse
to those of the other members of the class certified by the trial court, and
thus these property owners should not be included in the class. 3 7 9 The court
also applied the same rationale to the Broken Sound Club, which it found
would have an interest directly adverse to the interests of the individual
property owner-members of the class.38 ° In attempting to sort out the various
classes, the court noted that the dispute sub judice presented "the
quintessential scenario for class action treatment."8 The court found it
improbable that individual members of the class would have the resources to
pursue their common interests individually, or alternatively that the courts
"would be clogged ad infinitum with the individual suits. ' ' 38 2 Noting that
"Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a)(2) requires only that the resolution
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id.
Id.
Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
Id. Count I alleged a violation of Boca Raton city ordinances. Id.
Id.
Id.
Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1767.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of common questions of law and fact affect all or a substantial number of
class members," the court held that the adequacy of representation
requirement can be met where the named representatives of the class have
interests in common with the proposed class members.383
Moving to a discussion of the various counts in the complaint, the court
held that the issue involving an alleged violation of a city ordinance does not
sound in fraud, and was thus properly certified as a class action count.384 As
to the remaining three counts, the court assumed that the two counts not
certified by the trial court, Counts II and IV, were rejected for class
certification, the trial court also specifically rejected count HI, constructive
trust for class certification.38 5
The fourth district ruled that Count II, sounding in civil theft, charges
"willful, intentional and wrongful diversion of the golf course open space,
and refusal to return the property or the proceeds obtained as a result of the
diversion of the ownership rights. 386 Stating that an action for civil theft is
not tantamount to an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud, the fourth
district held 387
that the civil theft count should have been certified as a class
action count.
Likewise, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in refusing to
certify Count III, constructive trust, for class certification. 388 The court
noted that "[f]raud claims which have been considered unamenable to class
action [treatment] arise from circumstances in which each defrauded party
has a legally distinct claim, each depending on its own facts."
Notwithstanding the fact that the count in the complaint alleged that the
developer failed to disclose the inadequacy of the golf facilities to
accommodate the entire ultimate population of Broken Sound, the appellate
court found that "a substantial number of the members of the class . . .
[would] have a common interest in the remedy. 390 Thus, the court also
reinstated Count III, constructive trust, as amenable to class action
treatment.3 9' Finally, in consideration of Count IV, unjust enrichment, the
court summarily held that the common interests of a substantial number of
members of the class 392
would be adequately represented in the count for
compensatory damages.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at D1767 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2)).
Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1768.
Id.
Id. at D1768.
Id.
Id.
Arvida, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1768.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Graves v. Ciega Verde Condominium Ass'n, 393 arose out of the
foreclosure of a construction lien.394 "Fred Graves (Graves) was a licensed
general contractor who performed repair work to the exterior siding of the"
Ciega Verde Condominium buildings. 395 A dispute erupted,- resulting in
Graves' filing of a lien for approximately $52,000, the unpaid contract
amount.396 Graves subsequently sought to foreclose the construction lien, by
filing a foreclosure suit. 397 "In the foreclosure action, Graves alleged that
each unit owner was liable for a proportionate share of the expenses of"
maintaining the common elements. 393' "Graves recorded a notice of lis
pendens against all of the unit owners," sued each unit owner individually,
and named the association as the class representative. 399 "Service of process
was issued against Ciega Verde, both individually and as the class
representative." 40 The association answered both individually and as class
representative, and discovery ensued. 40 1 "Thereafter, the contract portion of
the action was set for binding arbitration," in which the association
participated. 402 Graves prevailed in the arbitration, recovering his total
demand.40 3 Graves served the association with "a motion to confirm the
40 4
arbitration award and to set [the] cause for trial on the foreclosure action."
The trial court entered a judgment foreclosing thirty of the thirty-two units
because two had been released during the pendency of the litigation.
Some two years after the initial filing of the suit, the association
retained new counsel, who filed a motion to set aside the foreclosure
judgment, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order
foreclosure. 40 5 The trial court granted the motion and required Graves to
personally serve each individual unit owner. Graves complied with the
order. "[T]he unit owners [then] moved to dismiss the amended complaint
claiming that Graves filed the amended complaint on May 23, 1994, and
therefore, service on the unit owners had not been accomplished within 120

393. 703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
394. Id. at 1110. For applicable law on construction liens see FLA.

STAT.

§§ 713.001-

.37 (1997).
395.
396.
397.
398.

Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1110.
Id.
Id.
Id.

399. Id.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Graves,703 So. 2d at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
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days from filing the original complaint." 4 6 "The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, and entered an order dismissing the individual unit
owners from the action. Because the applicable statute of limitations had
expired, Graves was precluded from bringing a new foreclosure action
against the unit owners." 40 7
At issue on appeal was whether the trial court obtained jurisdiction over
the individual unit owners through service of process on the association. 4 08
Citing Rule 1.221 of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure,the fourth district
held that the unit owners, "as members of the class, have a common interest
regarding the maintenance of the common elements of the condominium
property."4 In addressing the unit owners' arguments that they should have
received individual service to satisfy "due process concerns,
the Fourth
District responded that the association has "a fiduciary and statutory duty to
give notice of a lawsuit to the unit owners." 4 "
The result in Graves certainly seems equitable on the merits. Clearly,
the association has the fiduciary duty to represent the interests of all unit
owners in the litigation. Additionally, any unit owner who does not wish to
subject his or her unit to a potential foreclosure action may relieve his or her
condominium parcel of the lien by exercising any of the rights of a property
owner under Chapter 713, 412 or "by payment of the proportionate amount
attributable to his or her condominium parcel. '41 3 The courts' imposition of
a new "fiduciary and statutory duty to give notice of a lawsuit to the unit
owners" 414 is cause for concern. Although most associations will routinely
report on the nature and status of pending litigation, an association is only
obligated by statute to "give notice" of a lawsuit if the association's liability
in an action exceeds insurance coverage; 41 5 when the association 416
is
contesting ad valorem taxation for all units in a condominium project;
when the association is involved in litigation with exposure of more than

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
So. 2d 251
411.

412.

Id.; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(1).
Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112 (citing Kesl, Inc. v. Racquet Club of Deer Creek II Condominium, 574
(Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1991)).

Id.
FLA. STAT.

§§ 713.001-.37 (1997).

413. FLA. STAT. § 718.121(3) (1997).
414. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1112.
415. FLA. STAT. § 718.119(3) (1997).
416. FLA. STAT. § 194.011(3)(e) (1997).
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$100,000.00; 4 '7 and when the association is named as class representative of
the unit owners in an eminent domain proceeding. 418
D. Community AssociationLitigation-Attorney's Fees
Undoubtedly, the prospect of exposure for payment of an adversary's
attorney's fees serves to discourage the litigation of cases without substantial
merit. The Florida Condominium Act has long evinced a prevailing party
attorney's fees approach to dispute resolution. 419 The case of Ares v.
Cypress Park Gardens Homes I Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,42° involves a
condominium unit owner's suit against his association for "production of
[official] records, injunctive relief, and an accounting." 421 The parties
settled the unit owner's claims in mediation but apparently decided to defer
resolution of entitlement to attorney's fees.4 2 According to the opinion, the
parties agreed that a special master would be appointed to determine which
party prevailed on each issue.423 "The [special] master issued a report and
recommendation finding that [the unit owner] succeeded on one claim, that
the Association prevailed on three claims, and that one of the claims did not
support an award of fees to either party under the statute." 424 Over the unit
owner's objection, the trial court 42confirmed the master's recommendations
and awarded the fees accordingly. 5
After concurring (without recitation of the facts of the case) that the
association prevailed on the count for production of official records, the
court further held that there was no error in the trial court's ruling that
section 718.303(1) of the Condominium Act does "not authorize attorney's
fees in an action for an accounting." 426 This aspect of the decision is
curious, since section 718.303(1) confers a right of action by a unit owner
against the association. 427 Although a suit for accounting is typically a twostage proceeding, first establishment of the right to an accounting and then
the actual accounting itself,428 an "accounting" is essentially an equitable
417. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1997).
418. FLA. STAT. § 73.073(3) (1997).
419. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(4)(k) (1997).
420. 696 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
421. Id. at 886.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Ares, 696 So. 2d at 886.
426. Id.
427. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (1997).
428. See A-1 Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Vilberg, 222 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969).
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remedy 419 that is based upon a legal relationship directly established by the
Condominium Act, which establishes a fiduciary relationship between the
officers and directors of an association and the unit owners. 430
With respect to Mr. Ares' request for injunctive relief, the second
district concluded that the lower court erred in finding that the association
prevailed on the unit owner's request that the trial court enjoin the
association from further violations of its bylaws and the Condominium
Act.43' While agreeing that a perpetual mandatory injunction, requiring an
association to abide by its documents and comply with the law is
inappropriate, 432 the second district noted that the issue before the master
was not whether Mr. Ares would have prevailed on a claim for such an
injunction.433 Rather, the court noted that the master was called upon to
determine whether the unit owner had been successful on his claim as it was
resolved in the settlement agreement.43 4 The second district, noting the
association's admission of various statutory and documentary violations in
its answer, held that the unit owner prevailed in his endeavor to require the
association's adherence to its bylaws and the Condominium Act.435 In
apparent dicta, the court also noted that the unit owner's complaint, seeking
an injunction which prohibited the association from conducting its affairs "in
violation of the law and condominium documents" is distinguishable from
"perpetual prohibitory injunctions," and apparently enforceable. 436
In Cuervo v. West Lake Village HI Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,437 various
"ousted directors" appealed the ultimate award of attorney's fees to the
438
association.
The genesis of the dispute was a contested condominium
4
39
election.
The appellants, claiming to be victorious, seized control of the
association's bank account and transferred funds to a different bank. 44 0 The
association contested the validity of the election. 44' The appellants filed for

429. See Manning v. Clark, 56 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1951).

430.

FLA. STAT.

§ 718.111(1)(a) (1997).

431. Ares v. Cypress Park Garden Homes I Condominium Ass'n, 696 So. 2d 885, 887
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
432. Id. See also Indian Trail Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., v. Roberts, 577 So. 2d 998
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
433. Ares, 696 So. 2d at 887.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. 709 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
438. Id. at 598.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 598.
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arbitration pursuant to section 718.1255 of the Act. 44 2 "During 443
the
arbitration proceeding, the association was represented by [a] law firm."
During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the same law firm "filed
a three-count complaint against [the] appellants and the association's former
management company," seeking return of the association's funds, damages
for conversion, and damages for "breach of fiduciary duty for its role in the
subject election." 444 "The association pled an entitlement to attorney's fees"
as well.445 The action was stayed "pending the resolution of the arbitration
proceeding." 446
4
The arbitrator ruled in favor of the association." 7 The lower court
entered a temporary injunction requiring the appellants to relinquish the
association's funds." 8 The appellants also filed an answer and affirmative
defenses to the complaint, as well as a counterclaim. The same law firm that
had been representing the association up to this point in the proceedings
filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the counterclaim." 9 In response
to the filing of a counterclaim against the association, the association's
insurance carrier retained a second law firm to represent the association in
the litigation. 45 The second firm filed an answer to, and thereafter
defended, the counterclaim. 451 The two law firms continued to represent the
association's interests in the matter, although "the gravamen of both the
main action and the counterclaim action centered around the issue of the
validity of the appellants' election as directors. 452 Before trial, the
association prevailed in obtaining partial summary judgment and was
determined to be the prevailing party. The law firm initially3 retained by the
association was awarded approximately $45,000 in fees. 45 There is no
mention of an award of fees to the firm retained by the insurance carrier.
On appeal, noting that the issues raised in the main action and
counterclaim "were inextricably intertwined such that a determination of the
issues in one action would necessarily be dispositive of the issues raised in
the other," 454 the court ruled that the trial court erred when it failed to
442. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1997).
443. Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.

444. Id.
445. Id.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id.
Id.
Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599-600.
Id.
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consider and reduce the attorney's fees awarded to the first firm for the
duplication of their legal efforts with the second firm.455 Finding it
undoubtable that the actions of the two firms were "duplic[ative] and
overlapping," the court concluded that "the most appropriate way of
accomplishing [the] task [would be] to reduce the fee awarded to the [first
firm] by the reasonable value of all of the [second firm's] services in this
cause."' 45 6 Although the court was undoubtedly justified in reducing the fees
awarded to the extent they were duplicitous or overlapping, it is submitted
that it is unfair to the association to reduce the fees payable to its primary
counsel by the reasonable value of services performed by insuranceappointed counsel.
First, there is no suggestion in the opinion that the fees charged by the
association's primary law firm were unreasonable. Second, there is no
statement in the opinion that the association (or its insurance carrier) sought
compensation for the fees incurred by the insurance company-appointed
counsel. Therefore, recognizing that "a party has the absolute right to hire as
many attorneys as it desires,"a5 there is no evidence that the appellants were
called upon to compensate for overlapping efforts. The reality is that many
community associations are more comfortable having their general counsel
represent the association's interests in litigation matters. When insurance
company-selected counsel is brought into the case through the filing of
counterclaims, or in cases where the association is sued as a defendant, the
association should retain the option of keeping its general counsel in the case
without being penalized by an arbitrary standard that reduces fees payable to
the association's general counsel by the amount reasonably incurred by the
insurance company-appointed firm.
E.

Covenant Enforcement

Mora v. Karr,458 involves the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 459 Mr.
Karr wished to purchase a home in a deed restricted community. 460 He
desired to tear down the existing residence and build a "larger home with a
three-car garage. ' 46' The "deed restrictions [permitted] only a two-car
garage and [required] a thirty-five foot setback., 462 Prior to buying the
property, Mr. Karr obtained an agreement from the original developer, "as
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 887.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
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well as the adjacent property owners on463
either side, the Xaviers and the
Moras, waiving the two deed restrictions."
During construction of his new home, Mr. Karr received a letter from
464
Mr. Mora threatening suit over violation of the restrictive covenants.
Mora filed suit and sought a temporary injunction. 465 "The day before the
hearing [on the motion for temporary injunction,] the Moras moved to
amend to add the Moores as additional plaintiffs, which was granted. 466
Mr. Moore testified that although he was being represented in the action by
the same attorney as the Moras, he was not obligated to pay any attorney's
fees to the Moras' counsel. 467
The trial court denied the temporary injunction, holding that "the
waiver, . . . the change in conditions in the neighborhood since the
imposition of the restrictive covenants, and the fact that there was little
likelihood that the appellants would prevail on the merits," 468 justified denial
of their motion for a temporary injunction. Citing Enegren v. Marathon
Country Club Condominium West Ass'n, Inc.469 the court held that the
Moras' claim was barred by the doctrine of waiver. 470 As to the Moores'
claim, the appellate court, citing a Supreme Court of Florida case from
1930,47' held that the Moores' delay in "seeking relief until eight or nine
months after construction commenced would warrant denial" of their request
for injunctive relief.472
Miami Lakes Civic Ass'n v. Encinosa73 is the latest in a series of
cases 474 which grant associations the right to interpret or apply deed
restrictions beyond the four comers of the deed restriction and its verbiage
itself.475 Mr. Encinosa constructed a deck in the back yard of his home
"without the prior approval of the Miami Lakes Architectural Control
Committee [ACC] as required by certain restrictive covenants." 476 The
463. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
464. Id.

465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.

469. 525 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The Enegren case is actually most
often cited as an estoppel case.
470. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888 (citing Enegren, 525 So. 2d at 488).
471. Mercer v. Keynton, 127 So. 859 (Fla. 1930).
472. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888 (citing Mercer v. Keynton, 127 So. 859 (Fla. 1930)).
473. 699 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
474. See, e.g., Europco Management Co. of Am. v. Smith, 572 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Coral Cables Inv., Inc. v. Graham Cos., 528 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
475. Encinosa,699 So. 2d at 271.

476. Id.
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covenants permitted the ACC to refuse approval of plans "on any ground,
including purely aesthetic grounds, which in the sole and uncontrolled
discretion of said Architectural Control Committee shall seem sufficient. 4 77
After completion of the deck, Mr. Encinosa submitted plans to the ACC,
which denied the after-the-fact submittal. 478 The ACC found that "the deck
was too large and 'out of context with what was going on in the surrounding
properties and on the lake as a whole."' 479
The trial court held that the association could not enforce the covenant,
as it had engaged in selective enforcement by "allow[ing] other violations to
go unchecked.4 a 0 The trial court "also determined that there was a lack of
criteria or guidelines for construction of decks. 4 1
However, the appellate court held that once "[tihe association ... put
on a prima facie case demonstrating Encinosa's violation of the restrictive
covenants, the burden shifted to Encinosa to show that the association had
acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner., 482 On the selective
enforcement issue, the appellate court held that Encinosa had not provided
"competent substantial evidence to support such a finding., 48 3 Although no
other suits had been filed against homeowners for alleged deed restriction
violations, the appellate court was satisfied that the record reflected that all
other disputes were resolved by voluntary compliance.48 4 With respect to the
homeowner's argument that the deed restrictions contained insufficient
guidelines, the court held that the ACC's disapproval was based upon the
fact that Encinosa's dock was "much larger in scale than the other structure
on the lake. ' 485 Thus, the appellate court implicitly found that "the look" of
the neighborhood constituted a sufficient criteria for the ACC's review of
dock construction plans. Although it was certainly a challenge for the court
to balance the free use of one's property with the collective aesthetic needs
of a deed restricted community, it seems that the court recognized that not
every conceivable construction request will be addressed through a written
covenant. The general character of the neighborhood can be used as a
legally valid basis by an architectural committee in reviewing construction
plans and requests.

477. Id.
478. Id. at 272.

479. Id.
480. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d at 272.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 272 (citing Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
483. Encinosa, 699 So. 2d at 272.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 273.
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Various Tort Liabilities

Although most community associations are not for profit corporations
generally engaged in a cooperative effort to enable residents to provide for
each others' health, safety, and welfare, the Florida courts have nonetheless
applied premises liability duties to associations, which are similar to those of
a landlord in the landlord/tenant context. 486 Lotto v. Point East Two
487
Condominium Corp., involves a suit by a condominium resident, Mrs.
Lotto, who sued the association after "[s]he tripped and fell on a portion of
an exterior sidewalk which [was] cracked and partially uneven. 4 88 Mrs.
Lotto admitted that she had regularly "walked over [the] same stretch of
sidewalk" on many occasions. 9 The association acknowledged that the
sidewalk was cracked and deteriorated, but that it was not unreasonably
dangerous.490 "The association argued that it had no duty to warn [Mrs.
Lotto] of the condition of the sidewalk because [its] deteroirated condition
was obvious." 49 1 The trial court agreed with the association and entered
summary judgment in the association's favor.492
On appeal, the third district agreed with the trial court, holding that the
association did not have a duty to warn Mrs. Lotto.4 93 However, the court
went on to state that the obviousness of the condition did not relieve the
association of the duty to repair the sidewalk.494 Applying duties from the
Second Restatement of Torts relative to invitees, the court held that there
remained a factual issue as to "whether the association should anticipate"
that residents would use the sidewalk and thus encounter the cracked and
uneven concrete, "notwithstanding that the condition was obvious" and that
the invitee "would be harmed thereby. 495 Based upon the necessity of this
496
inquiry, the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate.
The court did note that Mrs. Lotto's familiarity with the condition of the
sidewalk, and "her decision to proceed to encounter the risk,"
would raise
497
the question of "whether she was comparatively negligent."
486. See, e.g., Czerwinski v. Sunrise Point Condominium, 540 So. 2d 199, 200-01
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
487. 702 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
488. Id. at 1361.

489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Lotto, 702 So. 2d at 1361.
493. Id. at 1362.

494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Lotto, 702 So. 2d at 1362.
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The case of The Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. G.G.V.
Associates, Ltd.,4 98 addresses the issue of "whether the economic loss rule
bars a negligence action in the context of a third-party beneficiary of a
professional consultant's contract when the plaintiff is seeking to recover
only economic [damages]. 499
The condominium association sued the developer, the engineering
company employed by the developer, and an architectural firm employed by
the engineering company "for economic damages resulting from the faulty
conversion of an apartment complex into a condominium project." 5" The
asserted liability of the consultant was based on "its alleged faulty inspection
and inaccurate disclosure and [the] report [it] prepared pursuant to its
contract with the engineering company." 5°I It was alleged that the report
was intended to meet the developer's obligation pursuant to section 718.616
of the Condominium Act, and that the report was therefore "intended to
inure to the benefit of the condominium [unit] purchasers." 502 "The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the consultant, holding that
50 3 the
rule."
loss
economic
the
by
barred
was
action
negligence
association's
In ultimately affirming the trial court's decision, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal engages in a thorough review of Florida's "economic loss rule"
The court held that "purely economic expectations arising from
case law.
of the relationship between a condominium association and the parties
responsible for the construction of the condominium" are not the types of
interests intended to be protected by tort law. 50 5 Although this case is clearly
consistent with the progeny of "economic loss rule" cases, it is this writer's
opinion that the denial of a remedy to innocent and often unsophisticated
condominium home buyers is the single worst disservice done by Florida's
courts to Florida's community association citizens. As most succinctly
observed by former Chief Justice Barkett:
If the allegations of the homeowners in this case are true, their
homes are literally crumbling around them . . . . The courts,
including this one, have said "too bad." I find that answer
unacceptable in light of the principle underlying Florida's access to

498. 710 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
499. Id. at 702.
500. Id.

501. Id.
502. Id.
503. G.G.V. Assocs., 710 So. 2d at 702-03.
504. Id. at 703-05.
505. Id. at 704 (quoting Sandarac Ass'n, v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d
1349 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
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courts provision: that absent compelling,
countervailing public
50 6
policies, wrongs must have remedies.
One of the most common fears expressed by potential community
association volunteers is the exposure to personal liability. Fortunately, the
courts have once again emphasized that individual directors of condominium
associations cannot be held liable for a negligence action, even when such
actions were clearly wrong. 5 7 One such case involved a suit by Mr. Perlow,
"individually and as the trustee for a group of condominium [unit]
owners... against two directors of the condominium association, [Mr.]
Goldberg and [Ms]. Leb." 50 8 "The alleged breach of fiduciary duty was the
directors' failure to properly administer insurance proceeds from Hurricane
Andrew." 50 9 In considering the interplay of the Condominium Act, 510 the
Florida Business Corporation Act,511 and the Florida Not-for-Profit
Corporation Act,5 12 the court concluded that more than simple negligence
must be pled and proved before personal liability can be successfully
asserted against an association director.5 13 Fraud, criminal activity, and selfdealing/unjust enrichment are the only situations in which a director of an
association may be held personally liable for his or her acts or omissions
emanating from service on the board. 4 The court distinguished B & J
Holding Corp v. Weiss, 5 15 "where the initial directors of a condominium
association were held individually liable for failure to collect maintenance
payments on unsold units." 5 6
The court found that B & J was
distinguishable because that case involved self-dealing by a developer's
appointees to the board of directors in the form of the directors not collecting
assessments from the developer, to the detriment of the association, and
giving5 1 reater loyalty to the director's relationship to the development
entity.

Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, v. Charlie Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
(Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See Perlow v. Goldberg, 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 149.
Id.
FLA. STAT.§ 718 (1997).
511. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1997).
512. FLA. STAT. § 617 (1997).
513. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 149.
514. Id. at 150.
515. 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
516. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
517. Id.
506.
1244, 1248
507.
508.
509.
510.
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